Do secrets leak into GitHub Actions logs? What the new workflow-log secret scanning catches, what it misses, and why wfx-loot deletes logs
Yes, secrets can end up in Actions logs. On November 9, 2026, GitHub put secret scanning for workflow logs into public preview. It scans completed runs for known provider patterns and keeps an alert even after the log is deleted. It also has hard limits: only some enterprises can use it, it is off by default, it does not look at old logs, and it sends no notifications. The wfx-loot campaign deleted runs and logs after its payload ran, so a gap in run numbers is often the trace that remains.
What the November 9 preview does
According to GitHub's changelog, secret scanning now detects secrets in GitHub Actions workflow logs, in addition to issues, wikis, discussions and pull requests. The feature is in public preview.
- When it scans: when a workflow run completes, GitHub scans its logs for provider patterns.
- Where you see results: findings appear in the repository's secret scanning alert list, next to alerts from code and other content, with a link back to the workflow log.
- Validity checks: these run for supported secret types.
- Deleted logs: GitHub says alerts remain available even after the logs are deleted.
The changelog does not say how soon after a run completes the scan happens, so this page does not claim that a run deleted within a minute would be scanned first.
What it misses
These are the limits GitHub lists for the preview. Treat them as a checklist of cases it will not cover:
- Eligibility: it is available to enterprises on GitHub Enterprise Cloud with GitHub Secret Protection or GitHub Advanced Security, including data residency on GHE.com.
- Off by default: an enterprise owner turns it on under Policies, then Advanced Security, by choosing Enabled in the All repositories dropdown. The policy is disabled by default and applies only to repositories that already have secret scanning enabled under those licenses.
- No backfill: only runs that complete after you enable it are scanned. Existing logs are not scanned.
- Pattern limits: generic patterns, custom patterns, AI-detected secrets, and secrets already masked by Actions are not detected.
- No notifications: alerts from workflow logs do not generate notifications during the preview. GitHub says to check the repository's secret scanning alert list directly.
So an alert can survive a deleted log only if the feature was already on, the run finished after that, and the leaked value matched a supported provider pattern.
Why wfx-loot deletes logs, and what still remains
Researchers describe the same cleanup in the wfx-loot campaign, which they date from about November 10, 2026. This page covers only the log side. For how to spot the campaign and rotate tokens, see our wfx-loot guide.
- The actor reverts the payload commit, with messages such as
ci: restoreorci: cleanup, and deletes the workflow run along with its logs. Aikido says this takes at most a minute. StepSecurity says usually within a minute. - A missing run number in the Actions history is often the remaining trace. StepSecurity's advice is to look for a missing run number right after a suspicious commit, and it says a missing run probably means the stealer ran. As its example, StepSecurity reports that in
drunomics/nuxtjs-drupal-cethe Actions history goes from run #1963 to #1965, with #1964 gone. - GitGuardian is more careful: "A gap in run numbers proves a run was created. It does not prove the run executed." It found run-number gaps at the payload commit in 37 of 65 November injection commits it sampled, and most of 158 sampled throwaway workflows left no run or workflow record.
- Aikido says the run log was deleted in affected repositories, which is why its count of repositories where the payload ran may understate the real number. It reported indications of at least 1,806 repositories. That is Aikido's figure from its November 12 write-up and is not combined here with other researchers' counts.
- The attacker does not always succeed. StepSecurity says that in
nextcloud/dockerrun #2675 was never deleted, and its public log showed the stealer's own markers,memscan_files,archive_bytesandexfil_no_runtime_vars. - The npm hook form is a different log problem. It changes no workflow file, so there is no injected workflow run to delete. GitGuardian reports public job logs from a sample of 19 repositories where the script ran, with a successful exfiltration reported in 18.
Aikido and GitGuardian also say the stealer was set up to send data by HTTP and, later, Telegram, with the options that write data into the run log turned off. Scanning logs would therefore not be where the stolen secrets show up. The logs matter here as a record of what ran.
Log deletion still helps an attacker against teams whose only record is the Actions tab, or who rely on notifications. It also helps against organizations that are not eligible for the preview or have not enabled it. The preview and the campaign arrived in the same week. This page does not claim GitHub built the feature because of wfx-loot.
A short checklist for maintainers
- Check whether your enterprise is eligible, and whether an owner has enabled the policy. It is off by default.
- Name the person who reviews the secret scanning alert list. There are no notifications during the preview.
- Assume history from before you enabled it has not been scanned.
- Keep your own habits for secrets the preview cannot see: custom formats, generic values and anything Actions already masked.
- Do not treat a missing or empty log as proof nothing leaked. If you find a run-number gap after a suspicious commit, rotate every secret that workflow could reach and follow the wfx-loot guide. The earlier GhostAction guide covers what stolen GitHub tokens can do.
Where release integrity fits
Log scanning looks for leaked secrets. It does not tell you whether a published release was changed. Stolen publishing tokens remain a risk to releases. The wfx-loot guide states that none of the researchers it cites reports a confirmed GitHub release-asset swap, and nothing on this page changes that. Locking Actions shows which code ran, not what it printed, as explained in the workflow lockfiles guide. To see whether the tools you install have locked releases, search the ReleaseLock directory, and read Can this GitHub release be swapped? for what each lock level means.
Quick answers
Does GitHub secret scanning for workflow logs scan my old logs?
No. GitHub says only workflow runs that complete after you enable the feature are scanned, and existing logs are not backfilled.
Will I get an email when it finds a secret in a log?
No. GitHub says alerts from Actions workflow logs do not generate notifications during the preview, so check the repository's secret scanning alert list directly.
Who can use workflow log secret scanning?
The public preview is available to enterprises on GitHub Enterprise Cloud with GitHub Secret Protection or GitHub Advanced Security, including data residency on GHE.com. It is disabled by default, and an enterprise owner enables it in the enterprise Advanced Security policy.
What does it not detect?
GitHub says generic patterns, custom patterns, AI-detected secrets, and secrets already masked by Actions are not detected in this preview.
If a log is missing, does that mean nothing leaked?
No. In the wfx-loot campaign researchers say the actor deleted workflow runs and logs after the payload ran, and a missing run number is often the remaining trace. GitGuardian notes that a gap proves a run was created but not that it executed, so treat a gap as a reason to investigate.
Sources
- GitHub Changelog, Nov 9, 2026: Secret scanning detects secrets in GitHub Actions workflow logs
- Aikido, Nov 12, 2026: wfx-loot campaign pushes CI secret stealer to tens of thousands of repositories
- StepSecurity, Owais Shaikh, Nov 12, 2026: WFX Phantom, the GitHub Actions secret stealer that deletes its tracks
- GitGuardian, Gaetan Ferry, Nov 13, 2026: wfx-loot, a CI secret stealer pushed with stolen GitHub credentials